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Are Independent Councillors Really Conservatives in Disguise? 
Abstract
A feature of English local political folk-lore is the belief among national political parties, that Independent councillors are Conservatives in disguise. Yet, little evidence is given to support this idea because little is known about these councillors’ beliefs and assumptions or how they distinguish themselves from the party politics they eschew. In this paper we address the question: Are all Independent councillors really Conservatives? The paper answers the question by reporting the finings of research conducted among Independent and Conservative councillors in England to explore the complex, multi-dimensional and fluid world that is Independent politics. 
Introduction
An enduring piece of political folk-lore, from those involved in party politics, is that all Independents are in reality Conservatives, or, what Grant (1971 and 1973) called: ‘concealed Conservatives’. As with much folk-lore its origins are difficult to pin-point but the idea that local non-partisan politics has hidden Conservative tendencies is well established.  Grant (1977) provides a powerful insight to the development of this view by showing the malleability of Independent politics and the intermingling between Conservative and Independent councillors as an electoral expediency. He displays how Independent and Conservative politics can become conflated despite his evidence that the two groups often faced each other in council chambers. Since Grant’s ground-breaking analysis of Independent politics there have been few studies of what distinguishes Independents from other local politicians. 
The merging of Independents and Conservatives in the political psyche was given a spur by the serious local decline of the Conservatives in local government after John Major’s 1992 General Election victory​[1]​. As a corollary of local electoral difficulties a new phenomena entered political discourse, the ‘Condependent’ (Harrison, 1996: 10). The tainting of the Conservative brand, at the time, was such that many Conservative councillors took the pragmatic view that electoral survival was only possible by standing as an Independent. Given that candidates in rural areas were well known enough to forgo party identification, this seemed a safe strategy (Harrison, 1996, Wingfield, 2000: 142). 
The purpose of the paper is to test the idea that Independent and Conservative councillors are politically indistinguishable. The election of 12 Independent Police and Crime Commissioners and an Independent mayor in Bristol, on 15th November 2012, means the time is right to explore independent politics. We do this by posing hypotheses about independent politics (see next section). The first section of the paper outlines the research; the second examines Independent councillors’ location on the political spectrum holding that against their political beliefs and affinities towards national parties. The third examines Independent and Conservative councillors’ scope of representation and their views about the powers and role of central and local government. It also considers the trust Independent and Conservative councillors express in a number of political institutions and their views about the level at which certain political decisions should be made. The fourth section develops the concept of Independent local politics and examines the findings. The paper concludes by answering the question rooted in political folk-lore: are all Independents really Conservatives? 
1. Exploring Independent Politics
To explore the nature of Independent, non-partisan politics we devised three hypotheses drawing on other research that suggested Independent councillors: would seek to distance themselves form party politics, rather than support or display an affinity toward, any political party (See, Boogers and Carter, 2010 Aars and Rinkjob, 2005); that they would have a stronger relationship to their electoral areas and to the council area, than partisan councillors (see, Jones, 1969, Grant, 1971 and 1973, Glassberg, 1981, Reiser, 2008, Boogers and Voerman, 2010 (a); and, that Independents would want to see local government as a strong and equally independent governing institution (See, Bottom and Copus, 2011, Copus, et al, 2009). We drew from this that Independents would be sceptical about the motives and activities of larger, more centralised political and governing institutions. 
The hypotheses to be tested are, that Independent councillors will: i) display a very particular two dimensional form of localism which gives priority to the needs of the immediate electoral area and its communities above the council area itself; ii) display a stronger localist tendency than Conservative councillors given the latter’s national party membership; iii) support moves towards stronger local government with greater powers and freedom from the centre. Linked to these hypotheses is the need to understand whether Independent councillors display support for, or an affinity with, national political parties. As understanding Independent relationships to political parties, provides another lens through which to view their role in local government. 
The research for this paper involved a self-completed, postal questionnaire the sample frame for which was supplied by the Independent Office of the Local Government Association (LGA), to whom we are grateful for their assistance and support. The population was all Independent councillors sitting on all types of councils in England (n=1192, at the time of the survey) and a rounded response rate of 31 per cent was received. The same questionnaire was distributed to a stratified sample of 1058 Conservative councillors sitting on councils in England without Independent representation. The response rate was 30.4 per cent. The survey was complemented by: 45 interviews with Independent and Conservative councillors; two focus groups; interviews from a linked but separate project; and, observations of council and public meetings where Independent and Conservative councillors were present. 
A note of caution must be added when reporting data from surveys with response rates such as ours and only new surveys and a larger response rate could confirm or refute the patterns that emerged from this survey.  Given the composition of the Independent councillor population and the responses to the survey, the findings can be reported with some confidence that they represent broad patterns existing in the Independent councillor population. We can state this because the findings were supported in qualitative research among councillors and were remarkably consistent with our survey findings. Demographically the profile of Independent councillors is different from the wider councillor population having more males and being older. The Local Government Association’s survey of elected members (NFER, 2011) found that the gender divide (M:F) was  68:31 per cent, for our Independents it was 76:24 per cent. The LGA’s survey found that the mean average age for councillors was 59.7, our Independents respondents were, on average, almost five years older at 64.08, sd = 9.98. The average age of our Conservative respondents was 58.39 years. Independents on average had lived in the area for which they were a councillor for 41 years; Conservatives had lived in their area for 33.5 years.  
The research tested the party affinity of Independent councillors with respondents asked: to self-locate on the political spectrum, answer questions about how close they ‘felt’ towards parties and state the party they had voted for in the 2005 and 2010 General Elections. But, because of the weaknesses of relying on self-assessment (Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003; Mair, 2001; Mair, 1986) and our desire to test the hypotheses above, we asked respondents about: their scope of representation, central-local government relationships, the powers of local government, trust in various political institutions and the level at which given political decisions should be taken. 
We asked about these aspects rather than specific policy areas because testing attitudes about council policies such as privatisation, public-private partnerships or council tax levels ignores the hegemony of neo-liberalism in local government. Testing policy here would not expose much given the pervasive nature of managerialism. Exploring broad conceptual and practical aspects of Independent and Conservative local politics could illuminate similarity and distinction in a way that focusing on council decisions would not.
2. Political Location and the Independent Councillor 
The difficulties of placing political actors on a left/right continuum are well documented (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara and Tanebaum, 2001; Laver, 2001; Mair, 2001; Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Casteles and Mair, 1984). The complexities of assessing the political space occupied by Independents are exacerbated by the absence of a de jure group loyalty. Conover (1984) notes that identification with a group influences the political perceptions of individuals, so if as Copus et al’s (2008) typology indicates, some Independent councillors have an affinity towards a party that will influence their political self-location.  
Alongside group solidarity are cultural implications of language on ideological positions, Inglehart and Klingemann (1976:244) argue that ‘…although the left-right terminology does have an ideological meaning to Western publics, it also has a major component based on party identification’. We might have a shared understanding of the left-right scale but it is operationalised by how close one identifies with a party. Inglehart and Klingemann present a range of factors militating against the use of a left-right scale such as social class and religious affiliation, which affect political self-location and could lead to self-location in a spurious space. 
A further problem in employing political self-location is what is being measured: belief or ‘fact’? Luskin, (1987) noted that respondents appear more able to deal with measures of knowledge as opposed to abstraction-based measures of cognitive organisation. Huber and Inglehart (1995:75) simply ask: What meaning does the left-right dimension have today? They note that neo-Liberal hegemony may have transcended, over time, traditional left-wing and right-wing characterisations. Here we rely on our research findings that indicates the population of interest experienced political life across a period more significant than the post Thatcher years. Our respondents’ median age was 65 indicating that they had witnessed consensus politics prior to the turbulence of the 1970s and the subsequent shift to the right of the centre of political gravity in the UK. We do not rely on political self-location but a series of questions designed to produce a fuller picture of Independent politics. 
First, we discuss the findings of Independent political self-location, voting patterns from the last two General Elections and explore regional variations. The results of self-location are unsurprising insofar as 34 per cent placed themselves in the centre. Either side of the centre an interesting picture emerges. Twenty-seven per cent of respondents placed themselves to the left of centre while 39 per cent placed themselves right of centre. If we look at respondents’ voting behaviour in General Elections we see clearer divisions. In the General Elections of 2005 and 2010, 41 and 42 per cent of Independents voted Conservative respectively; while those voting Labour were 20 per cent in 2005 and 10 per cent in 2010. 
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Table 1 shows a majority of respondents voted in the two elections for a centre right party with almost two thirds doing so in the 2010 election. There is the reduction in the Labour vote between the two elections and a rise in the share of votes for Independent candidates. A cross tabulation of political self-location against respondents’ region gives some interesting results. Respondents from the North fall into a clear centre-left distribution. As we move south, the distribution shifts to a centre-right/right preference with respondents from the South and the East regions self-locating furthest right. 
Our results show that 19 per cent of those voting for an Independent candidate in 2010 live in the North and the East Midlands, and 10 per cent lived in the West Midlands. While this analysis is helpful, the number of respondents and the myriad voting options makes geographic comparison complex. In conflating regions and voting options the outcome is more clearly illustrated. 
The geographical division of England into regions and the plethora of electoral options at a General Election meant the complexity of the potential cross-tabulations was unhelpful in determining patterns, connections or differences in political identification between Independent councillors across England. To add clarity categories of both geographical space and electoral options were conflated. The led to a three way division of England into North, Central and South while at the same time voting options available at the General Election were reduced from individual choices to five categories​[2]​ matching a typology of established political parties, other potentially national political parties,  local political parties, single issue parties and finally Independents. The categorisation allowed the analysis presented in Table 2 which prima facia illustrates the impact of the wider political culture in which elections within the UK, but in terms of this analysis specifically England,  are contested. 

Table 2: North-South Divide and Independent voting 


	Three way Geographical division of England	Total
	North	South	Central	
Voting Patterns in 2010 General election	Main Party	Count	36	120	52	208
		% within Three way Geographical division of England	58.1%	69.4%	71.2%	67.5%
	Secondary Party	Count	14	34	9	57
		% within Three way Geographical division of England	22.6%	19.7%	12.3%	18.5%
	Geographic Party	Count	2	6	0	8
		% within Three way Geographical division of England	3.2%	3.5%	.0%	2.6%
	Single Issue Candidate	Count	1	0	3	4
		% within Three way Geographical division of England	1.6%	.0%	4.1%	1.3%
	Independent	Count	9	13	9	31
		% within Three way Geographical division of England	14.5%	7.5%	12.3%	10.1%
Total	Count	62	173	73	308
	% within Three way Geographical division of England	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%


Councillors in the North of England were less likely to vote for one of the three main parties, but of more importance had a greater propensity to vote Independent compared to their colleagues in the South.  What is clear, however, is the impact of political culture.  Table 3 illustrates the propensity for actors outside of the South to eschew the opportunity to vote Conservative. Independent councillors in the South demonstrated a stronger support of the Conservative Party, as indicated by their voting behaviour at the 2010 General Election than their counterparts in both Central and, of greater significance, Northern England.  In addition support for the Conservative’s coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats, was also far stronger in the South than other areas of England. While Labour’s vote was weak across England regional ideological identification did not result in a homogeneous transfer of votes to the Conservative party, as shown in Table 3.  








*The totals are less than 100 per cent due to the omission of votes for the following:  Anti War in Afghanistan, BNP, English Democrat, ICHC, Independent Health Concern, Liberal, Mansfield Independent Forum, Mebyon Kernow, Social Democrat and Tendering First which between them account for the remaining nine per cent of the votes cast.

Respondents were asked how closely they identified with the three main parties. The results indicate a preference for the Conservative Party with 52 per cent stating a close affinity here, while 42 per cent had a close affinity with the Liberal Democrats. Over 75 per cent of respondents indicated their distance from the Labour Party. Of the respondents who located themselves close to the Conservative Party 55 per cent were in the south where only 17 per cent of respondents felt close to the Labour Party. In the North 27 per cent felt close to the Labour Party but 34 per cent felt closer to the Conservatives. Feelings of affinity towards the Liberal Democrats were 25 per cent in the North and 45 per cent in the South
A picture emerged of how distant the respondents felt from the main political parties. In the South over 50 per cent did not feel at all close to the Labour Party while in the North the figure was 42 per cent. The movement from North to South is mirrored by a move in an increased Independent affinity with the Conservative Party and an increased level of antipathy towards the Labour Party. A cross tabulation of political self-location against voting at the 2010 General Election gives a more telling picture. Ten per cent of respondents who voted Conservative at the 2010 General Election self-located left of centre. Of those respondents who had self-located in the centre 38 per cent voted Conservative while another 8 per cent voted for UKIP: independent party political affinity is malleable. 
These results were summarised by an Independent councillor sitting on a Northern council: This is a strong Labour area and I have voted Labour all my life – I just don’t like the way they run the council. While a Southern based Independent councillor commented: I voted UKIP in 2010; I just had to vote against Brown and Labour, but I couldn’t bring myself to vote Conservative – although I have in the past, nationally, never locally. 
The closeness of the 2010 General Election to the survey will have influenced these results, as the last quote emphasises, and may have inflated Conservative support with Independents reflecting an anti-incumbent (Labour) government position. Further surveys after general elections will be needed to identify whether this factor is fluid or stable.
3. Independents: Putting the Local into Local Government?
After the 2010 General Election when the Independent MP, Dr Taylor, lost his Wyre Forest seat there were only three Independent MPs: two former Labour MPs and a former Ulster Unionist Party MP; there are no Independent MPs in the Commons without previous party membership. There are 181 Cross-benchers in the House of Lords and Russell and Sciara (2009), have shown, this group are not necessarily Conservative Party supporters. Our left-right and voting evidence, suggest we can say the same about councillors. Given that the overwhelming majority of Independents are in local government we wanted to test if they displayed views that would explain why they had local rather than national success (see, Reiser, 2008, Boogers and Voerman, 2010 (a) Boogers and Carter, 2010). We also wanted to see if they display views about localism and local politics that distinguished them from Conservative councillors and if they acted in a genuinely non-partisan fashion distancing themselves from national parties in the conduct of local politics (Aars and Rinkjob, 2005). 
To address these issues we considered as a variable councillors ‘scope of representation’. Glassberg (1981:80), who conducted much of his research in Conservative controlled Bromley, explored the extent to which the councillor saw representing the interests of the borough or his or her own ward as of prime concern. By looking at this variable we were able to make a judgment about the nature of councillors’ localism: was it council-wide or focused on an electoral sub-district (Eulau 1959, Jones, 1975). 
The limits of Localism
To understand the nature of Independent localism we extended Glassberg’s localism to encompass not only the priority given by councillors to the interests of the electoral area, the council or those who voted for them, but also the extent to which councils should have more power and freedom from the centre (John and Copus, 2010). Each dimension is considered in turn in the tables below displaying responses from Independent and Conservative councillors. We asked three questions about whose interests the councillor would place as top priority, to which only one answer was permitted. 
Table 4 and Chart 1 display the responses.
Table 4: Councillors’ Scope of Representation
						Independents	Conservatives
	%	
The interests of the entire council area	35.6	47.5
			
The interests of the ward or division from which the councillor was elected	63.3	51.9
			
Those who actually voted for the councillor	.6	.6
			









Chart 1: Councillors’ Scope of Representation


There is a clear difference between the scope of representation for Independent and Conservative councillors, with almost two-thirds of the former and just over half the latter prioritising their ward above the interests of the whole council (Glassberg’s ‘classic parochials’). Independent localism rests on a very local perspective and  they are firmly located in their wards, being likely to have lived there for considerable time, be active in local civil society and have a high profile, level of engagement, standing or recognition. Thus, we argue that Independent localism does not recognise the appropriateness of a left-right political view.
Many Independent interviewees attested that they were ‘known’ within their wards long before they were elected (Lee, 1963) and that their desire to put the ward before the council arose because they felt part of those communities and were determined to pursue their specific needs. Far from being an insult, ‘parochial’ is a badge of pride for Independent councillors who see their role as a pastoral one and as promoting policy that benefits a specific council sub-area and its communities. An Independent councillor commented: ‘In a council meeting a Tory shouted at me “you should get out of your ward sometimes”. I replied, then I’d be out of the council and rightly so. I shouted back – get out of the town hall sometimes, you might learn something. 
We can not overlook the fact that about half of all Conservative respondents placed the ward above the council, but they are split more evenly than Independents. So, is this form of sub-council localism a factor shared by Conservatives and Independents, with the latter just more predisposed to this view? The answer can be found in the somewhat artificial loyalty that party councillors stress towards their wards, which does mean prioritising the ward over the council  (see, Copus, 2004). Part of the answer may rest on whether the councillor’s party was in control of the council – council loyalty will be conflated with party loyalty and also with advancement by the councillor in the council through the party opening up access to offices. At the time of the survey Conservative’s were beginning to lose control of councils, whereas Independents had only ever controlled few councils. So, independent loyalty to a ward may be a product of opposition status on a council. In also emphasises that Independents eschew an ideological, left-right view of local politics which is underpinned by their voting record and their feelings of party affinity, which reflect not only regional variations but also attitudes towards party incumbents nationally and locally
The following statements from an interview with an Independent councillor, which summarises an overwhelming, view: 
If it wasn’t for local people, I wouldn’t be on the council. I know them and they know me and they expect me to look after the area and that’s what I do. The other wards have their own councillors and if they – because of party politics – put the council before the people who voted for them, then that’s their way of doing things –not mine. 
A point succinctly put by another Independent councillor: the ward comes first, every time and always. 




Table 5: Localist or Centraliser?
















Table 6: Local Government’s Freedom and Powers

















We are confident that Independents display a strong preference for local policy and priorities being set by the council and that central government should not over-ride what councils do (see footnote). The strength with which those views are held distinguishes a particular Independent approach towards localism, one which reflects the two dimensions of ward and council we posited in our original hypotheses, with priority going to the very local setting. . Independents reject the idea that government policy should have precedence over councils’ policies and seek independence from the centre. There is a form of militant Independent localism emerging that opposes government undermining locally set priorities. Conservative members are bound however, by a party loyalty and use of party for political career purposes. The means scores show a clear pattern has emerged distinguishing Independent and Conservative responses which supports our hypothesis about independent localism. What we also see when we compare the two tables and the sets of responses is that Conservatives have localist tendencies but also party loyalties. The tension between competing loyalty to locality or party is reconciled in favour of party when compared to Independents. 
Yet, some similarities between our two respondent groups have emerged. Fully 95 per cent of Independent respondents agreed that councils should have ‘greater freedom’ from central control; although this is the same figure among Conservatives. Some 92 per cent of Independents support greater freedom for councils to raise and spend money locally; which again is consistent with Conservative views on this question. It appears both Independent and Conservative councillors recognise that policy freedom requires financial freedom. 
Rather than rely on open-ended notions of ‘freedom’ we sought to understand the extent Independents and Conservatives wanted that freedom to go and thus they were asked to cast a view on a very specific local freedom: passing binding council laws. Respondents were given examples of issues which do not call for national solutions and on which councils could have legislative devolution:
	The abolition or allowing of fox-hunting;
	The banning or allowing of smoking in pubs and other public places; and, 
	Setting the age at which alcohol could be consumed
Chart two and Table seven shows the responses. 













Interestingly,the responses indicate a greater, albeit marginally so, ‘strong’ disgreement from Independents than Conservatives; Independents were more politically conservative than their Conservative colleagues in this regard. If however, we conflate the ‘disagree’ response categories we see from Conservative and Independent councillors a strong rejection, by around two-thirds in each case, of the power for councils to legislate locally. Thus, the demand for freedom for councils dissolved when respondents were faced with solving contentious political issues through the use of legislative power.
National, local or beyond?
To further test the nature of Independent localism, which we hypothesised is a distinguishing feature of Independent local politics, we went on to explore attitudes towards what level of government Independent and Conservative councillors felt certain policy responsibilities should rest. We also examined whether or not Independent councillors ‘trusted’  a number of institutions with such responsibility and in this way identified any incongruence in their attitudes. Respondents were asked to state the level of government - internationally, European, national, regional or local at which decisions on the following policy areas should be taken: environmental protection, fighting organised crime, agriculture, defence, social welfare, aid to developing countries, immigration and interest rates. These areas were selected because they represented policy and service domains where either all levels of government could have some input, shared or otherwise; or, they have what on first sight appear to be a logical location at the centre. 




Table 8: Where Should Policy be Made:  % resposne rates?
	International Level	European Level	National Level	Regional  Level	Local Level	Don't Know
	Con	Ind	Con	Ind	Con	Ind	Con	Ind	Con	Ind	Con	Ind
Protecting the environment	28.2	36.1	4.5	6.6	41	25.7	9	12.3	16	17.2	1.3	2.2




Aid to developing countries 	16.8	29.5	6.5	11.5	69	52.7	1.3	1.4	3.2	1.4	3.2	3.5







Table eight shows that Europe, as a locus of policy making, is eschewed by Conservative and Independents but the latter have a greater propensity, overall and across the policy domains, to prefer responsibility to rest at the national rather than local level. We admit some of the questions beg a particular answer – such as defence – others, such as fighting organised crime, agriculture and social welfare, gave respondents the opportunity to express the extent of their localism.  Little support existed for responsibility to rest with local government, although there was a small, hard-core, localist perspective on all questions.
When the results of the level at which certain policy domains should rest are compared with levels of trust towards political actors and institutions, a more complex situation arises. We asked what trust respondents placed in National Politicians, the UK Parliament and the European Union. We did this as a logical consequence of asking where policy responsibility should rest to see if respondents trusted those bodies. An eleven point scale was employed with 0 having no trust through to 10 having complete trust and this allowed respondents to place themselves on a continuum.  Table nine shows the results.












Conservative and Independent councillors coalesced around the centre when it came to views about ‘national politicians’ and ‘Parliament’.  Indeed, from the mid-point onwards the direction of travel is towards greater trust. Conservatives display more trust in national politicians, a mean of 6.3 as against a mean for Independents of 4.7. With Parliament the Conservatives again have more trust, a mean of 7.25 against an Independent mean of 6.2. The regard in which the European Union was held illustrated a divergence as to the magnitude of the antipathy displayed. Only eight per cent of Conservative councillors indicated a level of trust above the midpoint while the corresponding figure for Independent councillors was thirty per cent. A majority of Conservative councillors, 86 per cent, place their regard for the European Union below the midpoint with 45 per cent indicating a complete absence of trust. 
It follows that wanting national government to resolve issues seen as too complex for local government and having low levels of trust with national politicians are not mutually exclusive positions. The low level of trust displayed towards the European Union ties in with the allocation of policy responsibilities in table eight. Independents have a greater suspicion of higher levels of government and this links to our localist hypotheses. Moreover, it appears Euro scepticism is linked to scepticism of multi-national, big government and to scepticism about national government – again, this supports our localist hypotheses. Euro scepticism does not immediately align Independents with Conservatives as Labour has long had a Eurosceptic wing and the Conservative Party its Europhiles
4. Defining Independent Local Politics
Independent councillors present themselves as an antidote to national party involvement in local politics (Bottom and Copus, 2011) providing a clue to the nature of their localism. Grant (1977:1 citing Young, 1975) counter-posed the nationalisation of local politics and the maintenance of localist values with the latter being partly achieved through Independent politics. He emphasised ‘distaste’ of party politics as a uniting factor among Independents and that coherent localism rested on diversity within and between communities. Building on this analysis we have confirmed that Independent politics at the local level does not mean a lack of affinity with a national party, but that any such affinity displays itself at different levels of the governmental system. Independents eschew party politics in local government but not in politics completely. Context is a factor in how Independents relate to party politics.
An Independent councillor stressed the distinction she saw for her politics compared to those of the party councillors she faced in council, thus: 
I know they don’t run to HQ for every decision, but every decision or debate is used to attack the other party (and us) and to argue that only their party has the answers. It’s the ‘know-it-all politics we [Independents] can’t tolerate. One side doesn’t have the monopoly of knowledge. All that play-ground politics puts people off the council. We just say: let’s look at every issue, we might have some ideas and you might have some ideas, so let’s bring them together. That more than anything says to people how different we are to political parties and we try hard to remind people of that. 
There are different dimensions to Independent politics, particularly views about localism that distinguishes Independents from Conservatives. The spatial dimension displays a scope of representation that places the ward at the centre of political activity and loyalty. Independent councillors view representation as not only the transfer of political views to a representative chamber, but as defending, protecting and promoting the interest of a community within a larger political entity. Indeed, Independents act as the antidote to the negative effects of large local government. They are not swayed by Burkean notions of representation; for Independents, councils are indeed, a ‘congress of ambassadors’ and they must maintain the interest of their part against other parts of the whole. Independent councillors’ localism requires freedom within councils to articulate and pursue those interests which is facilitated and complemented by a parsimonious attitude towards group discipline (Copus et al, 2008).
Such a preference for the ward is in stark contrast to the attitudes of party councillors, who overwhelming place the council’s interest and their party above the ward (See, Copus, 2004, 2001 and 1999). Our evidence suggests Independents take a politico role to their wards – acting as a trustee until circumstances require that they act as a ward delegate and views emerging from it. 
Independent councillors’ view that local government should be free from central control is one that sees councils as service providers not as governing institutions with their own political powers. Independents and Conservatives reject councils as autonomous governing institutions.. Yet, Independent localism is something which moves beyond the ward into conceptualising local government in the same ways as the ward when it comes to relationships with the centre, that is, it has priority over and should have freedom from the centre. 
Local government freedom from the centre acts as a barrier for Independents to the intense party political world of national politics and at the same time allows for diversity and community in politics. The desire to distinguish themselves form party politicians and combatative, conflictual politics, explains why Independents rejected the legislative power we offered for local government. With such power Independents could not avoid being drawn into contentious national issues to be solved locally. Maintaining a neutral, apolitical ‘harmonic and factual’ approach to local politics (another defining characteristic of Independent politics) would be untenable as engagement with divisive and conflictual national politics would undermine Independent non-partisanship (Gohlert et al, 2008). Adverse public reaction to local legislation and the possible electoral consequences of passing what could be unpopular local laws weakens Independents’ localist stance. 
Linked to our localist hypotheses Independents reject strong local powers because they wish to avoid the recreation of statism in the locality – it is easier to promote ward interest in the setting of politically weak local government. Independents see councils as institutions for the provision of public services for which they want greater policy and resource freedom. That freedom does not translate into political and governing power; Independents seek freedom from government interference in carrying out the responsibilities local government has been given by the centre; not, freedom to act as a ‘government’. Independent councillors have a clear view of what constitutes local government responsibilities and those of other levels of government. The reason for this is expressed by one councillor in interview and displays a pragmatic assessment:
I’d fully support local government doing more, but how would we pay for it? Running additional responsibilities means more money and that would have to come from government. If government pays then it wants you to do what it wants – so we might just as well leave things as they are. Besides, as political parties run most councils you wouldn’t find anything different happening to now. 
The argument that Independent councillors are Conservatives is undermined by Independents’ refusal to view politics in the straight-forward ideological way taken by party members (Whiteley and Seyd, 1998 and 2002). Thus,  Independent councillors’ affinity to any party would not cloud their views when it came to local policy decisions. Independent politics is not however, apolitical but it is non-partisan and Independents combine non-partisanship with a distinct localist view which operates on a multi-level basis by unashamedly protecting each identified locality against the larger political and governing unit within which it is based. 
5. Conclusion
We set out to answer the question: Are Independent councillors really Conservatives? We developed a number of hypotheses which enabled us to compare the attitudes of Independent and Conservative councillors by testing the nature and extent of both respondent groups’ localism. We did this because the hegemony of neo-liberal thought and approaches towards local government means that examining council policy decisions is no longer sufficient to fully explain local political similarities and differences. 
We found that Independents locate themselves across the left-right political spectrum and in the past two General Elections had leant towards the Conservatives rather than the Labour Party. We also found however, that the support or feeling of closeness (or distance) when it comes to a national party expressed by Independent councillors, had a regional element which undermines accusations that such councillors were invariably Conservative supporters.  Indeed, the regional element of our findings indicates that outside of council politics Independents are likely to shadow the dominant local political culture. Thus, the willingness of Independents to step outside that culture when it comes to council politics is an especially distinguishing feature  as it means that they view politics on a multi-level basis, being willing to support a party at a national level, while opposing it, often vigorously and vociferously, locally. 
The malleability of the support for national parties held by Independent councillors reflected an important anti-incumbency approach towards politics. More research, particularly after a period of two-party coalition national government, will uncover the strength of our anti-incumbency thesis. But, despite any affinity towards particular national parties Independents are not willing to submit political independence or a separate identity, locally. It is this independence of approach to politics that distinguishes them from all parties, not just from the Conservative Party. 
We hypothesised that Independent councillors would display a two dimensional localism which prioritised the electoral area and its communities above the council area as a whole, but that they would also expressed their localism through the desire for greater freedom from the centre and greater political and governing powers resting with local government. Our findings supported the hypothesis that Independents support greater freedom from the centre for local government. The research confirmed the existence of a strong localism among Independent councillors and that they were also more localist in orientation than their Conservative counter-parts. It is the nature and strength of Independent localism that defines it as a particular strain of thought about, and an approach towards, local politics. The reason goes beyond the simple lack of membership of a national party and also displays a tendency towards oppositionalism among Independents as they will oppose political parties because they oppose party politics as a way of organising local government. 
Our hypothesis that, as a result of a localist orientation towards politics, Independents would see local government as a governing institution with political – particularly legislative – powers was not supported by the research. It is clear that there are limits to the extent of Independent localism. Independents want freedom from central control over the affairs of local government; they do not want local government to deal with and decide contentious national political issues which have a local manifestation or which could have different, locally inspired solutions. 
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Cronbach alpha α reliability Test 

Table 10: Reliability Statistics





























	Local government should be given greater freedom from central control to make the decisions it wants to make	Local government should be given greater freedom from central control to raise and spend money locally how it thinks best	It is right that central government controls what local government is able to do	Too much power for local government would be dangerous to the locality
Local government should be given greater freedom from central control to make the decisions it wants to make	1.000	.692	.232	.206
Local government should be given greater freedom from central control to raise and spend money locally how it thinks best	.692	1.000	.212	.220
It is right that central government controls what local government is able to do	.232	.212	1.000	.368






Table 11  Reliability Statistics 




Table 11a : Inter-Item Correlation Matrix - Localist
	When a council disagrees with national government policy in relation to some council responsibility the council should be able to make the decisions it wants to make, not those government wants made	Councils should put local priorities first and not national government policies	Doing the best for the locality is impossible when the national policies take precedence	Councils should not attach too much importance to national issues since there so many local problems
When a council disagrees with national government policy in relation to some council responsibility the council should be able to make the decisions it wants to make, not those government wants made	1.000	.580	.273	.324
Councils should put local priorities first and not national government policies	.580	1.000	.288	.387
Doing the best for the locality is impossible when the national policies take precedence	.273	.288	1.000	.321


















^2	  North = North, North West, Yorkshire and Humberside; Central = East and West Midlands; South = East Anglia, South East, South West and Greater London. Main Party = Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat; Secondary Party = BNP, UKIP, Social Democrat, Liberal; Geographic Party = Mansfield Independent Forum, Tendering First, Mebyon Kernow; Single Issue = Anti War in Afghanistan, Independent Health Forum; Independent = Independent
^3	  In the tables the overall value of the mean does not correlate with a stronger belief in localism in all instances. Questions were phrased positively and negatively, therefore, on some occasions a low value for the mean is indicative of a greater propensity toward localism.  The lower the value of the standard deviation the less the variance in the responses towards the question which is indicative of the degree of unanimity amongst respondents. The claims made so far have to be tested by the reliability of the subset; does the subset measure in a reliable manner what it purports to measure? To answer that question Cronbach’s alpha α was used to test the scale reliability (see appendices). As questions had been phrased in a positive and negative manner some questions were reverse coded to enable a reliability analysis to be conducted. The localism and freedom subscales of the questionnaire displayed reliabilities which were at the margins of the values widely accepted as indicative of a high degree of internal consistency. Localism returned Cronbach’s α = .68. The Freedom subscale also displayed similar reliabilities, Cronbach’s α = .63. Table 10 and 11 in the appendices is a correlation matrix of the subset freedom. The degree of correlation varies but the relative strength of the value has to be read in conjunction with the questions. While the strong correlation between the first pair of questions is to be expected, the low values between the first and fourth question is consistent with a respondent’s desire for greater freedom from central control. The tables along with the values for Cronbach’s α (see footnote 3 and appendix) are consistent with the respondents’ propensity to claim that they favour the local over the centre and that they want reduced central interference.
